

WiNG 5.X Feature Guide

EAP-TLS with Onboard RADIUS on AP

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Table of Contents

1. Overview.....	4
1.1 Trust Model in EAP-TLS	4
1.1.1 Client Trusting Server	4
1.1.2 Server Trusting Client	4
1.1.3 Certification Authority.....	4
1.2 EAP-TLS Deployment Architectures	5
2. Issuing certificates for the Access point.	6
2.1 Creating a RADIUS server trustpoint for the Access Points.	6
2.2 Automatically Distributing a Trustpoint Bundle to the Access Points	10
2.3 Configure Automatic CRL Updates	12
2.4 Wireless LAN and AP profile configuration.....	13
2.4.1 Creating RADIUS Server Policy for the Access Points.....	13
2.4.2 Assign RADIUS Policy to an AP profile:	13
2.4.3 Create AAA policy and add onboard RADIUS as a failover method if primary authentication server fails:	13
2.4.4 Create an 802.1X WLAN and assign it to the AP Profile:	13
3. Connect a wireless client and verify functionality using remote-debug wireless	14

1. Overview

This guide will explain how to configure an onboard RADIUS server on an Access Point as main or failover method to authenticate wireless clients using 802.1X with EAP-TLS method using client-side certificates. It will also cover Access Point certificate provisioning in order to be able to authenticate clients using EAP-TLS as well as automatic Certificate Revocation List download to keep updated list of revoked certificates.

Running EAP-TLS authentication method with onboard RADIUS server can be used either as a main authentication server or as a failover AAA server, should the primary become unreachable to provide full service survivability.

1.1 Trust Model in EAP-TLS

Trust model in EAP-TLS deployments is based on the trust model of Public Key Infrastructure. The Secured Socket Layer (SSL) Handshake is happening over EAP transport protocol at Layer 2.

EAP terminology is important to note here, as examples below will be using the same terminology. In the [RFC3748](#) that covers Extended Authentication Protocol (EAP) there are 3 main components:

- 1) **Supplicant** – this is a client device or end user machine, which initiates the EAP
- 2) **Authenticator** – the Access Point to which the client is trying to associate and that establishes a communication to the Authentication Server.
- 3) **Authentication Server** – the RADIUS server that responds to EAP messages to the authenticator.

In regards to PKI trust model there are several trust relationships that needs to be maintained:

1.1.1 Client Trusting Server

The Supplicant (or the client device, for example, an Android or Windows 7) must trust one root certification authority. This is given by the Supplicant's certificate signature. Using this root certification authority the client can validate the Authentication server that it is communicating with.

1.1.2 Server Trusting Client

To support EAP-TLS, the Authentication Server (most commonly a RADIUS server) must have a certificate signed by the Certification Authority that the Supplicant (client device) trusts as well. The Authentication Server in order will trust a client certificate that was signed by the same root certification authority that issued client's certificate.

1.1.3 Certification Authority


The Certification Authority acts as a third party that can validate the identity of the certificate holder. For this we have the digital signature of the authority (the certification-authority entity) that issued the certificate to the certificate holder.

Any device will have a list of trusted root certification authorities. This list is known as a certificate trust list (CTL). Any certificate in this list is automatically trusted by the client. Also note that a certificate of a trusted root certification authority is self-signed.


The certificate is validated using the public-private key pairs of the certification authority. If you trust the certification authority, then you trust this certification authority's certificate. The certification authority's certificate includes the certification authority's public key.

1.2 EAP-TLS Deployment Architectures

In traditional EAP-TLS centralized deployments proposed by many vendors today AAA server is located somewhere in customer's Data Center authenticating thousands of clients concurrently, along with PKI infrastructure (usually tiered Certification Authorities). While PKI infrastructure is generally able to manage large number of certificate due to the non-real-time nature of the process, the centralized AAA servers are often prone to overload in large deployments when handling thousands of RADIUS Requests per second from hundreds of different remote locations. This at least slows down the whole EAP authentication process for the wireless client, resulting in poor experience.



Zebra WiNG 5 leveraging distributed architecture advantages introduces distributed EAP TLS deployment model. In this model WiNG5 has combined the functions of the Authenticator and Authentication Server into each Access Point, creating a unified self-containing and highly scalable solution for EAP-TLS Deployment. In this scenario each Access Point is automatically provisioned with the RADIUS Server certificate bundle upon adoption, while CRL updates are handles via automatic periodic updates from each Access Point via any external file server:



2. Issuing certificates for the Access point.

It is important to remember that EAP-TLS authentication method requires both client-side and server-side certificates in order to perform mutual EAP-TLS authentication. This section will cover creation and import RADIUS server certificate to the Access Point that will be trusted by a Corporate Root Certification Authority.

Components used:


- Windows 2012 R2 server with Certification Authority and Domain Controller roles installed and configured.
- VX9000 controller running 5.8.1.0-012R WiNG release.
- AP7502 Access point running 5.8.1.0-012R WiNG release.
- iPad Mini 3 running iOS 9.1
- Sony Xperia Z1 running Android 5.1.1

2.1 Creating a RADIUS server trustpoint for the Access Points.


Trustpoint is a bundle of certificates and RSA private key needed to identify an end entity (client or server), as well as all the CAs (Root and Intermediate CAs) and end entity private key. Trustpoints can be used for different purposes, in this case it is required to create a trustpoint that will have a signed RADIUS server certificate and all Certification Authorities in the Root CA chain.

1	From the Controller issue a command to generate an RSA private key and Certificate Signing Request (CSR). The purpose here is to generate generic radius server certificate that can be used with a wildcard domain name, so this trustpoint can be automatically uploaded later on to any Access Point at any given RF Domain from the VX 9000 Controller:
<pre>VX#crypto pki export request generate-rsa-key onboardradius subject-name onboardradius.lab.local CZ JM BRNO ZEBRA TME LABS fqdn *.zebranoc.com sftp://user:pass@tme-dc-1.zebranoc.com/onboardradius.csr Successfully generated and exported certificate request</pre>	
2	Export generated private key from the VX, so it can be used later on to create a trustpoint bundle that can be imported to all Access Points:
<pre>VX#crypto key export rsa onboardradius sftp://user:pass@tme-dc-1.zebranoc.com/onboardradius.prv passphrase 1234 RSA Key successfully exported</pre>	
3	Resulted private key <i>must be decrypted</i> to allow its seamless export later on. Use <i>openssl</i> tools (link to download windows binaries): Open Windows Command Line or Powershell inside the C:\OpenSSL-Win32\bin folder (or any folder where openssl binaries are installed):
<pre>C:\OpenSSL-Win32\bin>openssl.exe rsa -in C:\onboardradius.prv -out C:\onboardradius-nokey.prv WARNING: can't open config file: /usr/local/ssl/openssl.cnf Enter pass phrase for C:\Users\Viacheslav\Desktop\onboardradius.prv: writing RSA key</pre>	


4	Decrypted Private RSA key file:
<pre> -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEowIbAAKCAQEAn4kncx8VHDGM5gtVU6vEqA6NeWf370k1TWwQqcbFAsERAQB/ sO9Eo/+aml8gv7dJwEwHgtZJ8x0rJuUHgwoFfEqr3cc6dmCuoccaLSSN5bbbohDmZ8 /O1+AFC81F2syoqznZBdry8XktjqfWsdg1oUjhWingcfY6QMG8zOLEd5zpb5ky712 yg0UgeR8obATRjKaR+ncI4P6qdKhJiBf4fHffNSZTRbyzJ2AyQm5Xr86FsxNSwou MdBnaKkCzOqFoJmnO3SBeBeZ9qTju32itU0Z4Fon4/cpWTLkuDipVeLfVbzN8kq4 cZ43RHJJCfEudoFnlNp8Z/c39RHZIEhM/E/SEQIDAQABAoIBAQCEJJOFTjbo5NZv L81mJlnPU8ABtftMkHqj5/x0QuUuIaDyFysAo9uA8tb05eJlR3C5cxVEBK00XBbF SxcRrdre6N+g9W3CexOVHmQnkXbLTxE1+LsyGwGAW5RDJQ1yfv8S70610Kbl1Lowt egFfriDUMB7VtmCnQMeegwJVLb5BBVuyF77gbTdOcVHQeC51vuietJcTd/JFSUpR lB4UZseDdMwdreSLA6d2iosTSzdR0pccrARoNrgThQwdlnXdAZEfo/GzyUFZ51gV2 CN/CLPVSFn3EN1AaukTyHwXg6Sgv2f+7Ag0arWJHdEFJ58mqm0Arp/49Du4VfTD6 /EV0T+fbAoGBAND4UlkkrKPiCw19+B86bvW6gXJ4Sjigup+5X8VRoK5JkqYDALU9 IaIc7tS865UnYA9cJM4rUO8rkEGq+FmfIv3UEaXsag2682u1Wo7OSOSUtq4LbLP PHT9sfKXOJ9Gd8o0vrekRtSpurXM8zgDNf3VK130heE8JvgvymjdIer5AoGBAMNw tH13cd5E5EUTkHfDxcG456jLlyie4Bs9wP7fOQDlayWM9eqyirXKw2ogZzYXV+3/ wOE/f8san2DL4LFMOW2x4gYRORerguxG8Fwo4TyU79UNbokJ7gFebPaEA41ug5A JOxr0xMJNbn6nJKpLVRO2V0unvdR3BEAnxYq2qm3ZAoGAUyeuCXgT9vb5TPompU6c Xv5D1qihaf1VRj//AoTOkEgSp2BR52254q54z/2QxkzGYNLhGAmWoEXmLqsRqC bzQ5rdwg66vMn70n9xHRVdxnWRockT1r5pdE6GwqLJAKfZ3uh4N7YxI9xVCZ7S nZIXR4SdvqwuDuZlSPdP5gkCgYBUuSQU0udcPlzz5Y1H9zdeAEP01KcQhtfanM9X4Q 1PofzVY3LGIg/HtVtoOrQXm8h1OyE95NvTlP6S4CuOmIavhX85Tp0XgiaWThauHU uLEtDmlX0Dc5QOnA6CYTHXxt6FEDbyLm3rmPRmUznrIL/tKVexGruY5fdIHLiixO 7schkQKBgA4NI7C94dOJm2cAvaKm6BSuoAinmnZ/5dpbmK10zXTK9EH8EKKR1mGK CR/RDEePUo+kOafVev6cRb23s5I90W5KcxyITe4ftoLCPdj1q7lmgcQ0qKd+dPv6 SwJ6L7QuvbmUah0yzjhAQcRw3tW+i2/ELMJ9T8cH2MYUpSedtoyN -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- </pre>	
5	Copy resulted file into your SFTP/FTP root folder replacing existing onboardradius .prv file. The goal of this operation is to have private key unencrypted available for export.
6	Open the imported CSR in any text editor and copy all the contents to the clipboard:
<pre> -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- MIIDBzCCAe8CAQAwTELMAkGA1UEBhMCQ1oxCzAJBgNVBAGTAkpNMQ0wCwYDVQQH EwRCUk5PMQ4wDAYDVQQKEwVarUJSQTEQMA4GA1UECxmHVhE1FTEFCUzEgMB4GA1UE AxMxb25ib2FyZjZlZG11cy5sYWVubG9jYmVwYyEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAA4IB DwAwggEKAoIBAQCFiSdzHxUcMYzmC1VTq8SoDo15Z/fs6TVNbcPxs8CwREBAH+w 70Sj/5qbVKC/t015YIEclknzHSsm5QeDCgV8Sqvdxzp2YK5xxotJI31tuiE0Znz8 6X4AULyUXazKiqdkF2vLxeS2OoVawOCWhSOFaKexp9jpaWbzPQsQPnOkHmTLvXbK DRSB5HyhsBOuMppH6dwjg/qp0qEmIF/h8d981JlNFvLmNydJCb1evzoWzE1LlC14x 0GdooolM6oWgmact7dIF4F5n2p0O7faK1TRngWifj9y1ZMuS40K1V4t9VwM3ySrhx njdeEckkJ8S52h83Wc/xn9zf1Efmh6Ez8T9IRAgMBAAGgVtBTBgkqhkiG9w0BCQ4x RjBEMBYGA1UdEQQPMMA2CCyoubGFiLmXvY2FsMAsGA1UdDwQEAwIEsDAdBgNVHSUE FjAUBgggrBgEFBQcDAQYIKwYBBQUHAWIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADggEBAF0v90BY vJs+WhGecWuP5Rk0B0jSBpxfu04YA13lpeNgs6ad/UcLaknH4ZgE6G+9aQ5tpY0T JlNy977hRsHITzNgdbN1AbbDsxgncQYEsAsg/1qYCd2zjxyy28NCzkwGoo3gCQO LrZVbFskWxPsAgsoPoePqd6I3Kjf9KdWpvOEFdY43bVsP/RvY5Wws5FCwH4Gj1jP DXG80NaYjgkI0tD1L0o6HxDZ26H5wgLrQLKoidbTmt5HRKcRnAFKwGj1PZogG/wA 3gdXjMd7Bjg/uRe+1Y3HZEsJvKmqzqdh1MbEgpk3HV1+p7k1IDeLJMmT5Am6qwx3V Cd3gXVubN4xVGxg= -----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- </pre>	
7	Login to the Microsoft CA certification authority web enrolment service @ <windows-server-address>/certsrv. Login using Administrator or Enrollment Agent account:




8 Press on **Request a certificate** -> **advanced certificate request** -> select **Certificate Template** as “**Web Server**”, paste CSR contents into Saved Request Field and press **Submit**:




9 Choose Base64 encoded certificate and click on Download Certificate:



10 Rename downloaded filename to **onboardradius.crt** (file extension must be **.crt**) and place the file into the root of your FTP/SFTP server.

11	<p>On the Home screen of Certificate Services web page go to “Download a CA certificate, certificate chain, or CRL”. Then select your root CA, select encoding method as <i>Base64</i> and click on <i>Download certificate</i>:</p>	
		
12	<p>Rename downloaded CA certificate file to <code>onboardradius.ca</code> and place it to the root of your SFTP/FTP server.</p>	
13	<p>As a result in the root of your fileserver (SFTP/FTP) you should have these 3 files prepared:</p>	
	<p><code>onboardradius.prv</code></p>	<p>RSA private key for the RADIUS server certificate</p>
	<p><code>onboardradius.crt</code></p>	<p>public signed X509 certificate signed by private CA</p>
	<p><code>onboardradius.ca</code></p>	<p>root CA certificate (or CA chain with all intermediary CAs)</p>
14	<p>Create a trustpoint bundle using these 3 files using <i>IZarc</i> utility if you are using Windows, other utilities will not work with WiNG. Create a <code>.tar</code> package: <code>onboardradius.tar</code></p>	



2.2 Automatically Distributing a Trustpoint Bundle to the Access Points

In order to provide RADIUS server services to authenticate wireless clients using EAP-TLS, each Access Point must have a trustpoint bundle to present RADIUS server certificate to the client that is trying to authenticate. This section covers automatic upload of the trustpoint bundle to adopted Access Points.

1	Upload trustpoint .tar bundle to the Controller first:						
<pre>VX#file-sync load-file trustpoint onboardradius sftp://usr:pwd@tme-dc-1.zebranoc.com/onboardradius.tar</pre> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse; margin-top: 5px;"> <thead> <tr> <th style="width: 20%;">CONTROLLER</th> <th style="width: 30%;">STATUS</th> <th style="width: 50%;">MESSAGE</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">VX</td> <td style="text-align: center;">Success</td> <td style="text-align: center;">Successfully initiated load file</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		CONTROLLER	STATUS	MESSAGE	VX	Success	Successfully initiated load file
CONTROLLER	STATUS	MESSAGE					
VX	Success	Successfully initiated load file					
2	Verify that the trustpoint has been successfully loaded to the Controller:						
<pre>VX#show file-sync load-file-status</pre> <p style="color: #00FF00;">Download of onboardradius trustpoint is complete</p>							
3	Add configuration to the Access Point profile to use new trustpoint. <i>Important</i> – this step must be performed before uploading trustpoint bundle from the Controller to the Access Points.						

```

VX#conf
Enter configuration commands, one per line. End with CNTL/Z.
VX-1(config)#profile anyap GENERIC-AP
VX-1(config-profile-GENERIC-AP)#trustpoint radius-ca onboardradius
VX-1(config-profile-GENERIC-AP)#trustpoint radius-server onboardradius
VX-1(config-profile-GENERIC-AP)#commit write
VX-1(config-profile-GENERIC-AP)#end

```

4 Distribute the trustpoint down to the Access Points (All or per RF Domain):

```

VX-1#file-sync trustpoint onboardradius ?
  DEVICE-NAME  Name/MAC address of AP
  all          All access points
  rf-domain    Upload all access points belonging to an RF Domain

```

```
VX-1#file-sync trustpoint onboardradius all
```

```

-----
CONTROLLER      STATUS      MESSAGE
-----
00-0C-29-DA-47-C7    Fail        Could not find any matching APs
00-0C-29-50-EE-80    Success     Added 12 APs to upload queue
-----

```

```
VX-1#show file-sync status
```

```

Number of APs currently being synced : 2
Number of APs waiting in queue to be synced : 0

```

```

-----
AP              STATE      UPLOAD TIME  PROGRESS  RETRIES  LAST SYNC  ERROR      SYNCED BY
-----
ap7502-6A2270  downloading  immediate    100       0        -          00-0C-29-50-EE-80
6522-1-office  downloading  immediate    100       0        -          00-0C-29-50-EE-80
-----

```

5 Verify that the trustpoint is now loaded on the Access Point:

```
VX-1#show crypto pki trustpoints all on ap7502-6A2270
```

```
Trustpoint Name: onboardradius
```

```

-----
CRL present: no
Server Certificate details:
  Key used: onboardradius-srvr-priv-key
  Serial Number: 14000000749d68b08e499eecb3000000000074
  Subject Name:
    /C=CZ/ST=JM/L=Brno/O=Zebra/OU=TMELABS/CN=radius
  Issuer Name:
    /DC=local/DC=lab/CN=HOMELAB-CA
  Valid From : Thu Dec 10 11:21:26 2015 UTC
  Valid Until: Sat Dec 9 11:21:26 2017 UTC

```

```

CA Certificate details:
  Serial Number: 71248696d64ddfa6482392195c668bd1
  Subject Name:
    /DC=local/DC=lab/CN=HOMELAB-CA
  Issuer Name:
    /DC=local/DC=lab/CN=HOMELAB-CA
  Valid From : Sat Apr 5 17:11:56 2014 UTC
  Valid Until: Fri Apr 5 17:21:52 2019 UTC

```

```
Trustpoint Name: default-trustpoint (self signed)
```

```

-----
CRL present: no
Server Certificate details:

```

```
Key used: default_rsa_key
Serial Number: 05fa
Subject Name:
  /CN=AP7502-84-24-8D-6A-22-70
Issuer Name:
  /CN=AP7502-84-24-8D-6A-22-70
Valid From : Wed Jan  1 00:01:37 2014 UTC
Valid Until: Sat Dec 30 00:01:37 2023 UTC
```

6 **Optionally configure automatic file-sync at the controller to allow for automatic trustpoint uploads for new Access Points upon adoption:**

```
VX-1#conf
Enter configuration commands, one per line.  End with CNTL/Z.
VX-1(config)#profile vx9000 NOC
VX-1(config-profile-NOC)#file-sync auto
VX-1(config-profile-NOC)#commit write
VX-1(config-profile-NOC)#end
```

2.3 Configure Automatic CRL Updates

Certificate Revocation Lists can be automatically downloaded by the APs at specified time intervals (from 1 to 168 hours) from external file server via file-sync operation.

1 **Optionally configure automatic CRL file download from an external file server.**
In this example CRL file is stored on an external HTTPS server and Access Points will update it every 24 hours:

```
VX-1#conf
Enter configuration commands, one per line.  End with CNTL/Z.
VX-1(config)#profile anyap REMOTE-AP
VX-1(config-profile-REMOTE-AP)#crypto pki import crl TMELABS-PKI https://tme-dc-
1.zebranoc.com/CRLD/TME-CA-ROOT.crl 24
VX-1(config-profile-REMOTE-AP)#commit write
VX-1(config-profile-REMOTE-AP)#end
```

2.4 Wireless LAN and AP profile configuration

2.4.1 Creating RADIUS Server Policy for the Access Points

```
!  
radius-server-policy ONBOARD-TLS  
  authentication eap-auth-type tls ignore-username-validation  
!
```

2.4.2 Assign RADIUS Policy to an AP profile:

```
!  
profile anyap REMOTE-AP  
  no mint mlcp vlan  
  no autoinstall configuration  
  no autoinstall firmware  
  use radius-server-policy ONBOARD-TLS  
  interface radiol  
  interface radio2  
  interface ge1  
  interface fe1  
  interface fe2  
  interface fe3  
  interface vlan1  
    ip address dhcp  
    ip dhcp client request options all  
  interface pppoe1  
  use firewall-policy default  
  logging on  
  logging buffered debugging  
  service pm sys-restart  
!
```

2.4.3 Create AAA policy and add onboard RADIUS as a failover method if primary authentication server fails:

```
!  
aaa-policy REDUNDANT-AAA  
  authentication server 1 host radius-primary.zebranoc.com secret 0 radiussecret  
  authentication server 1 timeout 1 attempts 2  
  authentication server 1 retry-timeout-factor 50  
  authentication server 2 onboard self  
!
```

2.4.4 Create an 802.1X WLAN and assign it to the AP Profile:

```
!  
wlan 8021X-CORP  
  ssid 8021X-CORP  
  vlan 1  
  bridging-mode local  
  encryption-type ccmp  
  authentication-type eap  
  no answer-broadcast-probes  
  use aaa-policy REDUNDANT-AAA  
!  
profile anyap REMOTE-AP  
  no mint mlcp vlan  
  no autoinstall configuration
```

```

no autoinstall firmware
use radius-server-policy ONBOARD-TLS
interface radiol
  wlan 8021X-CORP bss 1 primary
interface radio2
interface gel
interface fel
interface fe2
interface fe3
interface vlan1
  ip address dhcp
  ip dhcp client request options all
interface pppoel
use firewall-policy default
logging on
logging buffered debugging
service pm sys-restart
!

```

3. Connect a wireless client and verify functionality using remote-debug wireless

```

VX#remote-debug wireless rf-domain twinpeaks-domain clients all max-events 999 d
uration 999 events eap radius wpa-wpa2 management
Printing upto 999 messages from each remote system for upto 999 seconds. Use Ctrl-C to abort
[ap7502-6A2270] 16:37:22.928: mgmt:rx auth-req from 9C-F3-87-6B-9C-40 on radio 0 (mgmt.c:3801)
[ap7502-6A2270] 16:37:22.929: mgmt:tx auth-rsp to 9C-F3-87-6B-9C-40 on radio 0. status: success (mgmt.c:1302)
[ap7502-6A2270] 16:37:22.934: mgmt:rx association-req from 9C-F3-87-6B-9C-40 on radio ap7502-6A2270:R1 signal-strength is -
54dBm (mgmt.c:3782)
[ap7502-6A2270] 16:37:22.934: mgmt:Client 9C-F3-87-6B-9C-40 negotiated WPA2-EAP on wlan (ap7502-6A2270) (mgmt.c:3352)
[ap7502-6A2270] 16:37:22.934: mgmt:tx association-rsp success to 9C-F3-87-6B-9C-40 on wlan (ap7502-6A2270) (ssid:ap7502-6A2270) with
ftie 0 (mgmt.c:33)
[ap7502-6A2270] 16:37:22.935: eap:sending eap-code-request code 1, type 1 to 9C-F3-87-6B-9C-40 (eap.c:944)
[ap7502-6A2270] 16:37:22.935: eap:sending eap-id-req to 9C-F3-87-6B-9C-40 (eap.c:971)
[ap7502-6A2270] 16:37:22.974: eap:rx eap id-response from 9C-F3-87-6B-9C-40 (eap.c:677)
[ap7502-6A2270] 16:37:22.974: radius:aaa-policy REDUNDANT-AAA user: Slava mac: 9C-F3-87-6B-9C-40 server_is_candidate: 1 1 0
0 0 0 (radius.c:47)
[ap7502-6A2270] %%%>16:37:22.979: radius:radius server hostname [radius-primary.zebranoc.com] not resolved. request for 9C-
F3-87-6B-9C-40 dro
[ap7502-6A2270] %%%>16:37:23.480: radius:radius server hostname [radius-primary.zebranoc.com] not resolved. request for 9C-
F3-87-6B-9C-40 dro
[ap7502-6A2270] 16:37:23.981: eap:sending eap-failure to 9C-F3-87-6B-9C-40 (eap.c:987)
[ap7502-6A2270] %%%>16:37:23.981: radius:no response from radius server REDUNDANT-AAA:1 for wireless client 9C-F3-87-6B-9C-
40 (eap.c:366)
[ap7502-6A2270] 16:37:23.982: mgmt:tx deauthentication [reason: radius server timeout (code:23)] to 9C-F3-87-6B-9C-40
(mgmt.c:1849)
[ap7502-6A2270] 16:37:24.328: mgmt:rx auth-req from 9C-F3-87-6B-9C-40 on radio 0 (mgmt.c:3801)
[ap7502-6A2270] 16:37:24.328: mgmt:tx auth-rsp to 9C-F3-87-6B-9C-40 on radio 0. status: success (mgmt.c:1302)
[ap7502-6A2270] 16:37:24.331: mgmt:rx association-req from 9C-F3-87-6B-9C-40 on radio ap7502-6A2270:R1 signal-strength is -
54dBm (mgmt.c:3782)
[ap7502-6A2270] 16:37:24.331: mgmt:Client 9C-F3-87-6B-9C-40 negotiated WPA2-EAP on wlan (ap7502-6A2270) (mgmt.c:3352)
[ap7502-6A2270] 16:37:24.332: mgmt:tx association-rsp success to 9C-F3-87-6B-9C-40 on wlan (ap7502-6A2270) (ssid:ap7502-6A2270) with
ftie 0 (mgmt.c:33)
[ap7502-6A2270] 16:37:24.332: eap:sending eap-code-request code 1, type 1 to 9C-F3-87-6B-9C-40 (eap.c:944)
[ap7502-6A2270] 16:37:24.332: eap:sending eap-id-req to 9C-F3-87-6B-9C-40 (eap.c:971)
[ap7502-6A2270] 16:37:24.358: eap:rx eap id-response from 9C-F3-87-6B-9C-40 (eap.c:677)
[ap7502-6A2270] 16:37:24.358: radius:aaa-policy REDUNDANT-AAA user: Slava mac: 9C-F3-87-6B-9C-40 server_is_candidate: 1 1 0
0 0 0 (radius.c:47)
[ap7502-6A2270] 16:37:24.360: radius:access-req sent to 127.0.0.1:1812 (attempt 1) for 9C-F3-87-6B-9C-40 (user:Slava)
(radius.c:2996)
[ap7502-6A2270] 16:37:24.364: radius:RAD MSG AUTHENTICATOR (radius.c:1180)
[ap7502-6A2270] 16:37:24.364: radius:rx access-challenge from radius server for 9C-F3-87-6B-9C-40 (radius.c:3793)
[ap7502-6A2270] 16:37:24.364: eap:sending eap-code-request code 1, type 13 to 9C-F3-87-6B-9C-40 (eap.c:944)

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[ap7502-6A2270] 16:37:24.364: eap:sending eap-req [eap_type:13(eap-tls)] to 9C-F3-87-6B-9C-40 (eap.c:979)
[ap7502-6A2270] 16:37:24.450: eap:rx eap pkt from 9C-F3-87-6B-9C-40 (eap.c:700)
[ap7502-6A2270] 16:37:27.42: radius:access-req sent to 127.0.0.1:1812 (attempt 1) for 9C-F3-87-6B-9C-40 (user:Slava)
(radius.c:2996)
[ap7502-6A2270] 16:37:27.330: radius:RAD_MSG_AUTHENTICATOR (radius.c:1180)
[ap7502-6A2270] 16:37:27.330: radius:rx access-challenge from radius server for 9C-F3-87-6B-9C-40 (radius.c:3793)
[ap7502-6A2270] 16:37:27.330: eap:sending eap-code-request code 1, type 13 to 9C-F3-87-6B-9C-40 (eap.c:944)
[ap7502-6A2270] 16:37:27.330: eap:sending eap-req [eap_type:13(eap-tls)] to 9C-F3-87-6B-9C-40 (eap.c:979)
[ap7502-6A2270] 16:37:27.370: eap:rx eap pkt from 9C-F3-87-6B-9C-40 (eap.c:700)
[ap7502-6A2270] 16:37:27.372: radius:access-req sent to 127.0.0.1:1812 (attempt 1) for 9C-F3-87-6B-9C-40 (user:Slava)
(radius.c:2996)
[ap7502-6A2270] 16:37:27.381: radius:RAD_MSG_AUTHENTICATOR (radius.c:1180)
[ap7502-6A2270] 16:37:27.381: radius:rx UserName Slava for 9C-F3-87-6B-9C-40 (radius.c:1315)
[ap7502-6A2270] 16:37:27.381: radius:rx access-accept for 9C-F3-87-6B-9C-40 (radius.c:3558)
[ap7502-6A2270] 16:37:27.381: radius:radius: updating interim acct timeout of 9C-F3-87-6B-9C-40 to 1800 seconds
(radius.c:2136)
[ap7502-6A2270] 16:37:27.382: eap:sending eap-success to 9C-F3-87-6B-9C-40 (eap.c:987)
[ap7502-6A2270] 16:37:27.384: wpa-wpa2:tx msg #1 to 9C-F3-87-6B-9C-40 attempt: 1 (80211i.c:527)
[ap7502-6A2270] 16:37:27.390: wpa-wpa2:rx msg #2 from mu 9C-F3-87-6B-9C-40 (80211i.c:1074)
[ap7502-6A2270] 16:37:27.390: wpa-wpa2:tx msg #3 to 9C-F3-87-6B-9C-40 attempt: 1 (80211i.c:801)
[ap7502-6A2270] 16:37:27.394: wpa-wpa2:rx msg #4. WPA2-AES handshake done. 9C-F3-87-6B-9C-40 DATA-READY (80211i.c:1058)
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